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This study was undertaken for two basic reasons. It was
recognized that no generally accepted definition for "second
sourcing" existed either in the literature or in general use
within the acquisition community. The formulation of a working
definition of second sourcing was thus the first objective of
this research. The main thrust of the study, on the other hand,
was an attempt to formulate an evaluative model that could be
used by the decision maker in determining: (1) whether or not
second sourcing should be attempted in the acquisition of a
major system, and, (2) which second sourcing methodology would
be most suitable for the acquisition in question.
In formulating the model presented herein (the Second
Sourcing iMethod Selection Model)
, actual cases wherein second
sourcing has been or is being attempted were studied in depth;
and, the lessons learned in these efforts were consolidated
into a workable model. Both the advantages and disadvantages
of second sourcing have been outlined so that the decision
maker will not be misled.
Second sourcing, then, is found to be an acquisition strat-
egy that can result in significant benefit to the government.
It is a strategy that must, however, be selectively applied.
If attempted in a random or haphazard manner, the cost to the
government can be astronomical.

I. INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH — The purpose of this study was to
formulate a working definition of "second sourcing" in the
acquisition of weapon systems; and, to investigate the feasibil-
ity of formulating an evaluative model to be used in potential
second sourcing situations.
RESEARCH QUESTION — Can an evaluative model be developed that
will aid the decision maker in determining: (1) whether or not
second sourcing should be attempted, and, (2) which second
sourcing methodology would be most suitable for the acquisition
in question?
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY — The data expounded upon in this study
were collected through: an examination of acquisition litera-
ture; an examination of business clearances, procurement plans,
and other applicable project office and contracting officer
files and records; personal interviews with government and
contractor personnel involved in second sourcing efforts; and,
telephone interviews. Since the literature was rather limited
on the subject of second sourcing, the majority of the examples
and information included herein were collected during inter-
views — personal and telephonic.
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS — The scope of this study is essentially
limited to weapon system acquisitions and to buys of major
components of such systems. Further, the study did not con-
sider such concerns as component break out, small business
8

and labor surplus area set-asides, nor procurement from an-
other source following default termination. That is not to
imply that none of the observations provided herein can be
considered applicable to such cases, but only that data was not
:ollected to support such conclusions.
ASSUMPTIONS — Throughout this report it is assumed that the
iecision maker is free to make second sourcing determinations
(directed sole-source acquisition has not been mandated) ; that
standard Department of Defense (DOD) contracting terminology
and concepts are known to the reader; and, that the reader is
familiar with DOD project/program management structure, opera-
:ion, and terminology.
DEFINITION OF SECOND SOURCING AS USED IN THIS REPORT — A
review of the acquisition literature failed to uncover a uni-
form definition for second sourcing. At the inception of the
research, the following definition was pre-supposed : Second
sourcing is a method of obtaining alternate producers through
:he use of a technical data package which is utilized when
the specifications of the system are relatively stable and a
sole source producer (usually the developer) is currently
Producing the system. Such a definition assumed that a stand
llone reprocurement data package would be sufficient to bring
a second source producer on line. During the course of this
research, however, it became apparent that this definition
was too restrictive in that it focused en a single method of
developing a second source producer. Also evident was the

fact that no two field contracting personnel defined second
sourcing in exactly the same manner. For the purposes of this
report, therefore, the following definition (a much less res-
trictive one) shall be utilized: Second sourcing is a compen-
dium of techniques and methodologies with the avowed purpose
of ensuring the development of alternative production sources
such that the original developer/producer of a weapon system
does not become a monopolistic sole source for future reprocure-
ments . The definition, as stated, is intended to encompass
acquisitions based on: FORM-FIT-FUNCTION (F 3 ) , TECHNICAL DATA
PACKAGES (TDP) , DIRECTED LICENSING (DL) , LEADER-FOLLOWER (LF)
,
CONTRACTOR TEAMING (CT) , or any other strategy that, when ap-
plied, accomplishes the stated objective of developing an alter-
nate source of supply. Examples of acquisition actions that
are not considered to be covered by this definition include:
obtaining a system from a new source subsequent to default
termination; and, "component breakout, involving the decision
as to whether components should be purchased by the government
directly and furnished as Government Furnished Material (com-
monly referred to as GFE) or purchased by the contractor (CFE) ."
/T:3477
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY — This study consists of several
related topical discussions. Chapter II describes briefly
the framework within which the acquisition and contracting
process must function. Included therein is a discussion of
the acquisition process itself, a brief description of the
defense market, and an overview of the two major reasons for
10

second sourcing (competition and the maintenance of the mo-
bilization industrial base) . Chapter III presents some gen-
eralized findings regarding the perceptions of field contract-
ing and project office personnel and of selected contractor
representatives with respect to second sourcing. These find-
ings take the form of paraphrased answers to a research
questionnaire prepared by the originator of this study
/Appendix A/. Chapter IV presents some actual cases wherein
second sourcing has been or is being attempted. Both success-
es and failures are included along with a short discussion of
the lessons to be learned therefrom. Chapter V is an exposi-
tion of the cognitive model that is the product of this re-
search. This model was developed in cooperation with LCDR
Benjamin R. Sellers, SC , USN whose study entitled, "Competition
in Major Weapon System Acquisition, " is forthcoming (September
1979). Finally, Chapter VI contains the conclusions drawn
from this study and proposes the need to test the model devel-




II. FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
THE MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS — Appendix B is a flow
chart depicting the acquisition process. The acquisition of a
major system begins with the "evaluation and reconciliation of
needs in the context of agency mission, resources, and prior-
ities." /2i]7 When such an evaluation identifies a deficiency
in existing capabilities or an opportunity to establish new
capabilities, a mission element need statement (MENS) is de-
veloped. The MENS must identify the mission area; assess the
projected threat; identify existing capabilities; assess the
need in terms of such things as the task to be performed, de-
ficiency in capability, obsolescence of old systems, technical
advantage to be realized, and cost savings potential; outline
known constraints such as NATO rationalization, standardiza-
tion, and interoperability (RSI) ; assess the impact of not
acquiring or maintaining a given capability; and, provide a
program plan for meeting the perceived need.
The MENS, then, is submitted via the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE) to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) . This
stage of the process constitutes Milestone 0, Based on the
MENS and an associated. DAE position paper, SECDEF determines
whether or not to initiate a project. If SECDEF approves the
MENS, a Program/Project Manager (PM) is assigned to oversee the
project. Both the assignment and tenure of the PM are the
concern of the agency head who submitted the MENS. When as-
signed, the PM's first duties are concerned with staffing the
12

project office and the development of an acquisition strategy
(based on a consideration of the project's goals and objec-
tives) that is tailored to that particular project. It should
be noted, at this point, that SECDEF milestone decisions do not
authorize the commitment of funds. It is therefore necessary
to initiate action that will reflect such decisions in the
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) for congressional
authorization and appropriation action.
A mission need solicitation is next offered to potential
contractors for "competitive exploration of alternative sys-
tems. " This solicitation is in terms of mission need (not hard-
ware) because the objective is to gleen all the benefits of
industry's innovative talents and of competition. Also out-
lined in the solicitation are scheduling objectives, program
cost, constraints, and operating requirements for the system.
The resulting proposals from industry are then evaluated,
and, the most promising concepts are chosen for further ex-
ploration. Parallel short-term contracts (usually fixed-price
type) are awarded to explore and expand upon the chosen con-
cepts and to allow for reduction of the technical uncertainties
accompanying the various concepts. Upon evaluation of the
fruits of these explorations, the most promising concepts
are recommended to the agency head and a Decision Coordinating
Paper (DCP) justifying the recommendations is prepared. The
DCP is then submitted to the Service System Acquisition Re-
view Council (SSARC) /Defense System Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC) for review and comment, en route to the SECDEF, with
the agency head's request to proceed into the next phase.
13

Approval of this Milestone I DCP , then, constitutes a re-
affirmation of the MENS and permission to proceed with "com-
petitive demonstrations" of the alternative concepts. Such
demonstrations are designed to "verify that the chosen con-
cepts are sound, perform in an operational environment, and
provide a basis for selection of the system design concept
to be continued into full-scale development." /2 : 1 6/ During
this timeframe, it becomes important to identify tradeoffs
and potential delays, define program details, encourage in-
novation, and maximize competition. Finally, the results of
the demonstrations are utilized in the formulation of an up-
dated DCP with which the agency head will recommend the pre-
ferred system (s) — based on concept performance, risk analy-
sis, cost considerations, contractor management, technical,
and financial capability — for continuation into full scale
development, test and evaluation. At Milestone II, then, this
revised DCP is forwarded to SECNAV via the SSARC and DSARC for
approval
.
During the full scale development phase, scheduling and
control become more important considerations of the PM struc-
ture; negotiation techniques are emphasized (high risk situa-
tions usually resulting in cost-reimbursement type contracts
while low risk situations usually result in fixed-price type
contracts) ; there is a continuing evaluation of progress
through formal reviews, engineering reports and like indicators;
budgetary controls are stepped up; and, independent test and
evaluation of the systems is performed. Also during this phase,
14

long lead time production items may be ordered as required.
Finally, design/engineering/manufacturing specifications are
prepared and production models may be built. The object of
this phase is to develop a weapon system that will gain the
approval of both the SECDEF and Congress. Milestone III,
therefore, involves a decision on whether or not to proceed
into full production. Once again, the DCP is updated and a
request for approval to proceed is submitted.
On approval of full production, it becomes necessary to
award the production contract (s) and shift the emphasis of
the project to that of contract administration — including
production and user acceptance testing. Effective documenta-
tion of the company's performance becomes especially import-
ant as a basis for subsequent contract negotiations and for
determining the effectiveness and efficiency of contractor
performance.
This, then, is the project environment in which second
sourcing decisions must be made. The factors of importance
to these decisions will change in accordance with the phase
of the acquisition cycle in which the decision is made. The
earlier in the cycle that second sourcing is considered, the
more varied will be the options available to the decision
maker and the greater will be the probability of success.
THE DEFENSE MARKET — The defense market has been character-
ized, in recent years, by a decline in real dollar expenditures
The competition between firms in that market, at least in the
15

design/development phase of an acquisition, is therefore quite
fierce. There tends to be a notable excess in the capacity of
many defense oriented firms; a strong incentive to maintain a
reasonable level of engineering and manufacturing talent; a
desire to prevent heavy fluctuations in corporate workload;
and, a relative inflexibility on the part of the defense con-
tractors that makes- it quite difficult to utilize their re-
sources effectively in alternative markets.
Since the market is essentially monopsonistic , the govern-
ment (as the only buyer) enjoys a significant level of power
over the competing firms throughout the early stages of the
acquisition cycle. This relationship tends to change, however,
upon award of the production contract. From that time forth,
the atmosphere usually becomes one of a bilateral monopoly
(one buyer and one seller) . The power position previously en-
joyed by the government becomes significantly eroded — although
its position is bolstered by its significant legal and regula-
tory authority. Nonetheless, the fact that most production
contracts are awarded on a sole-source basis reduces the
government's leverage considerably.
The usual absence of production competition tends to in-
crease the incidence of "buy in" during the design phase. That
is to say that the contractors may tend to intentionally quote
unrealistically low prices, secure in the belief that there
will be sufficient opportunity to "get well" on subsequent
sole-source reprocurements . It is exceptionally difficult to
eliminate such tactics since the very nature of the buy is
16

such that the purchaser is without the benefit of a market
determined price for the system. The government is dependent
on informed judgement in evaluating the cost estimates on sys-
tems that have no commercial counterparts, are technologically
complex, and frequently push the state-of-the-art.
The sheer size of most systems acquisitions is another
factor of note. When millions or even billions of dollars are
to be spent over the life of a project, winning or losing a
contract may be a life or death determinant for an individual
firm. At the very least, the constitution of the market can
be changed drastically on the basis of a single award.
COMPETITION — A review of Contressional testimony, the litera-
ture of the acquisition community, or Federal and Defense
Department instructions and regulations reveals that competi-
tion is almost universally acclaimed as being good and desir-
able. This support derives from competition's promise of both
direct and indirect benefits in a free enterprise society.
In 19 65, SECDEF, then Robert McNamara, declared to the
Joint Economics Committee of Congress that savings on the order
of twenty five percent or more generally resulted from a con-
version from sole source to competitive purchases. More re-
cently, the Army Procurement Research Office (APRO) concluded
that there is no empirical support for such expectation
/Lovett and Norton 19 78/. That office then went on to attempt
the development of a methodology for estimating the savings
potential of competition. The study showed, among other things,
that savings have been and may be realized through competition.
17

It further demonstrated, however, than when savings do occur,
they cannot all be credited to competition; that there are
expenses that must be incurred to obtain competition; and,
there are other collateral problems created when competition
is introduced.
The question of whether or not competition will result in
benefits that exceed the costs incurred involves a careful
analysis of the trade-offs involved. There are effectively
two ways to increase competition in an acquisition: extend
design competition through later phases of the development
process (as with competitive prototyping) or introduce price
competition into the production phase of the cycle.
The history of government acquisition is filled with exam-
ples of development/design competition — reflecting the gen-
eral acceptance of this strategy. When one looks at the
production phase of the process, however, competition for re-
procurements tends to be the exception rather than the rule.
This fact seems to be the result of the widely held belief that
the costs of obtaining production competition usually outweigh
the benefits to be obtained.
MOBILIZATION INDUSTRIAL BASE — The Defense Acquisition
Regulation (DAR) states that:
Pursuant to 10 USC 2304 (a) (16) purchases and
contracts may be negotiated if 'he (the Secre-
tary) determines that (A) it is in the interest
of national defense to have a plant, mine, or
other facility, or a producer, manufacturer, or
other supplier available for furnishing property
or services in case of a national emergency;
18

or (B) the interest of industrial mobiliza-
tion in case of such an emergency, or the
interest of national defense in maintaining
active engineering research, and development,
would otherwise be subserved.' /Appendix C/
The Secretary, then, is authorized to take action that will
provide for an industrial mobilization base which can meet
production requirements for essential military supplies and
services.. This authority takes on special meaning when con-
sidering the need to second source an acquisition. In partic-
ular, it allows the government to eliminate the original pro-
ducer from consideration for at least a "minimum sustaining
rate" production quantity. Only then can the government be
sure of developing an alternate production source since the
competitive advantage of the original source is no longer a
factor.
The reasoning behind the mobilization base exception runs
along the following lines: during national emergencies it is
reasonable to assume that a single producer would be unable
to provide the system in the quantities necessary to respond
to the emergency; or, alternate producers should be available
for critical systems to prevent the possibility of a single
strike knocking out the country's entire production capacity
for those systems. When mobilization is the prime reason for





The purpose of this chapter is to present paraphrased
renditions of the more sanguine answers to the questionnaire
utilized by the originator of this research /Appendix A/.
SECOND SOURCING DEFINITION — When asked to define second
sourcing, the answers provided by those interviewed were many
and varied. For the most part, however, they were centered
around the concepts of production competition and mobilization
base maintenance. The definitions extracted emphasized the
goals and objectives to be achieved by second sourcing more
than the methodologies to achieve these goals
.
Some of the replies that emphasized both the competition .
and mobilization base aspects of second sourcing include:
1. Second sourcing is an acquisition strategy usually
attempted to obtain price concessions through competition. It
can also become necessary when monthly production requirements
are greater than the original producer can provide.
2. Second sourcing is the creation of a competitive atmos-
phere. Dual sourcing, on the other hand, involves the mainten-
ance of more than one source of production concurrently.
3. Second sourcing runs the gamut of (1) finding another
source for production after contractor default, (2) developing
an alternative producer for spare parts support, (3) obtaining
production competition via a technical data package, licensing
agreement, or leader- follower arrangement. Sole sources may
20

often be considered unacceptable for systems vital to our
national defense because of the danger of a first strike des-
truction or other crippling disruption.
Some other answers seemed to stress the mobilization
aspect of second sourcing to the virtual exclusion of any-
competitive effect:
1. Second sourcing merely means getting more than one
production source. Practically, it may be impossible to
achieve second sourcing without invoking exception 16 (mobili-
zation base)
.
2. It is perceived that second sourcing is a tactic that
can be used when one wishes to ensure more than one source for
mobilization base reasons (in which case competition is not a
primary consideration) . It is also used when one already has
one successful producer but it seems desirable to get competi-
tion. Unfortunately, it doesn't often work in such circum-
stances because the costs outweigh the potential competitive
benefits
.
3. Second sourcing is, very simply, an attempt to "break
out" an item so that we will have two contractors capable of
producing that item to specifications.
PROBLEMS — When asked what problems had been encountered in
second sourcing, a wide range of answers was provided:
1. There were not sufficient funds available to allow
successful second sourcing, so we had to abandon the idea.
21

2. Proprietary data problems arose which made it impos-
sible to transfer the necessary technology to a second source.
3. The original producer was extremely hesitant to "share
the wealth" with a second source. It may have been possible
to force his hand if the idea of second sourcing had been men-
tioned in the original production or development contract;
but, by the time we thought of it, it was too late.
4
.
A pre-determined budget locked us into one contractor
until the end of Research and Development (R&D) . By then more-
over it was tough to identify both the funds needed and the
competitors capable of bidding on a second source contract.
5. By the time second sourcing was considered, there
weren't enough years left in the project. You need two to
three years to bring a second source on line ... so it is
virtually impossible for short lived projects or those in
their out years to accomplish second sourcing.
6. We never get enough respondents to second sourcing
overtures. Most of those we do get are small businesses who
really can't handle the job but are trying to get a foot in
the door
.
7. Engineering Change Proposals (ECP's) are a real head-
ache with two production sources. The administrative burden
of coordinating the review, approval and implementation of
ECP's when multiple sources are involved is stiff ling. In
fact, the entire contract administration function becomes
excessively complicated when you have two or more sources
of supply for the same system.
22

8. With techniques like leader-follower, there is a real
question about the sincerity and willingness of the leader to
truly develop competition for himself. He will promise any-
thing to get that original contract, but once he gets it, it
becomes a whole new ball game. His first loyalty is to his
stockholders, and, he therefore wants to ensure that he re-
mains on top. This desire frequently results in a situation
where the lead company ensures that the follower is approxi-
mately comparable, but, never quite equal to the leader. This
is accomplished by leaving little "holes" in the data or other
covert actions
.
9. One very ticklish problem that can develop when one
attempts to develop a second production source is that the
original producer (especially when he is a heavily commercial
oriented firm) may decide that split buys do not provide him
sufficient return to remain in production. Loss of that orig-
inal producer altogether could be disastrous
.
10. The second source was never able to produce a qualified
product. Following the data package just wasn't enough.
11. Sometimes the pre- award survey teams are too quick to
certify a second source contractor. A small business frequently
lacks the skilled engineering talent needed to reconcile data
package problems without extensive governmental assistance.
Second source contractors should, thus, be chosen very care-
fully or the effort will cost the government dearly. Those
chosen should have vast experience in the type of production
involved; sufficient engineering and production expertise in
23

addition to the required technology and equipment; and, they
must be financially capable of performing the contract.
ADEQUACY OF THE DATA PACKAGE — The following are some of the
methods recommended for ensuring the adequacy of a technical
data package:
1. Government laboratories such as China Lake can be
tasked with the audit and certification of the data packages.
2. The second source should be provided with a "Chinese
copy" that can be torn down and examined with reference to
the data package.
3. The technical data package can never be made totally
satisfactory! There will always be omissions — either inten-
tional or inadvertent — that will make the data deficient.
Further, it is not always possible to identify, on paper, all
the "tricks of the trade" or process peculiarities that make
a particular producer successful.
4
.
Until a second source attempts to produce the item
based on the developer's data package, there is no way of know-
ing whether or not the data is complete and adequate. Once
found deficient, the government must be prepared to assign
technical experts to the task of helping the second source
resolve the problems encountered. This is an expensive pro-
position that is subject to both manning and funding constraints
5. We can state in the contract provided to the second
source that resolution of any difficulties with the data pack-
age is his responsibility. Unfortunately such a clause does
not help much when delivery slippages result in critical short-
ages in such systems.
24

6. From years of experience, it is important to keep
government laboratories out of the contractor's hair. These
labs are certainly not without technical competence (often
far superior to the contractor's) but it seems that their
main objective is to justify their own existence at the ex-
pense of the contractor.
MEASURES OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE — When asked to describe the
measures of success or failure that are utilized in evaluating
a second sourced acquisition, the responses usually centered
around cost savings/increases associated with application of
a second sourcing strategy.
1. If the unit cost of the system is lower from the
second source than was projected from an extrapolation of the
original producer's learning curve, the second sourcing effort
is a success.
2. Even when the follow-on contract is awarded to the
original producer after an attempted second sourcing, if (based
on past procurement experience) the price of the system is less
than would have been projected, the effort is a success.
When asked for a quantification of the costs and benefits
of second sourcing, most of those interviewed were hard pressed
to come up with any definitive responses . An Army Procurement
Research Office study, "Determining and Forecasting Savings
from Competing Previously Sole-Source/Non-Competitive Contracts
provides one method of estimating such factors, however.
Examination of that publication is therefore recommended.
25

AWARD SPLIT — When questioned about the best method to cal-
culate the production split between alternative manufacturers,
several means of determining the split were offered:
1. The low quantity should never drop below the minimum
sustaining rate. As to how to determine what that rate is,
the easiest method is to ask the contractor.
2. Splits can be determined arbitrarily — usually thirty
or forty percent should go to the high offeror with the remain-
der going to the low bidder.
3. Have the two sources bid on a "stairstep" quantity
profile and award the contracts on the basis of that combina-
tion of quantities that is most advantageous to the government.
4
.
Require bids that allow for extrapolation between the
high and low quantities. Award on the basis of that split
that is cheapest overall.
OTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS — Answers to other questions , in-
cluded in the questionnaire but not covered in the preceding





The following case studies are provided as illustrations
of second sourcing efforts that have been attempted to date.
Included are examples that have been declared successful as
well as some that have been branded failures. It is hoped
that examination of such cases will point out some of the
benefits that can be achieved through second sourcing as well
as the costs associated with application of the method.
ARN-84 AIRBORNE TACAN NAVIGATION SET — The original developer/
producer of the solid state ARN-84 was Hoffman Electronics, now
the NAVCOM Division of Gould, Incorporated. Hoffman was the
sole-source producer of the ARN-84 until 19 7 5 when the Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) , believing that Hoffman's price
of $26,000 per set was excessive, decided to second source
the following year's acquisition. The Navy utilized a re-
procurement data package, originally prepared by Hoffman, to
initiate the competition. Although Hoffman drastically cut
its previous price for the ARN-84 (quoting $17,000 per set),
they were underbid by ASC Systems which submitted a bid for
only $13,000. Hoffman informed the Navy that the $13,000
figure was less than the direct material and labor costs it had
experienced over the duration of its previous production
contracts. At that time, however, Hoffman had lost a great
deal of its credibility — evidence the $9,000 drop in the
price quoted by Hoffman.
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ASC Systems (a small business) is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of LaPointe Industries and is located in Connecticut. His-
torically, ASC Systems had, after some initial production dif-
ficulties, performed successfully as a second source for pro-
duction of the ARC-51 airborne UHF radio communications trans-
ceiver. When identified as the low bidder on the ARN-84, a
Navy pre-award survey team visited the company and concluded
that it appeared qualified as a producer of the TACAN . The
initial contract was subsequently awarded on 12 September 1975
for a quantity of 200 sets at a total price of $3.2 million —
with first production units to be delivered in February 1977.
By June 1977, the Navy was in a position wherein it needed
at least 200 more units to meet subsequent years requirements.
In a four firm competition, ASC Systems again underbid all
competitors at a price similar to that of its first contract.
The pre-award survey team again visited ASC Systems and repor-
ted good progress on the original contract.
The first production prototype passed qualification tests
in the fall of 197 6. Later that year, however, the Navy re- •
ceived a request for a several month extension of its first
production deliveries on the grounds that it had never been
notified "in writing" that the first production prototype had
passed qualification tests (specifically a 500 hour mean-time-
between- failure test) . Unfortunately, the Navy found that
someone in the contracts branch had, indeed, failed to mail
the required notification. The Navy was thus forced to accept
an extension of the first deliveries until mid-1977.
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Concurrent with this revised delivery schedule, the Navy
had a third ARN-84 buy in sight. Hoffman informed the Navy
that, if a third buy went to ASC Systems, Hoffman would close
its TACAN production line. At this time, it was becoming
evident that ASC was experiencing difficulties in the manufac-
ture of acceptable full production models. If Hoffman dropped
out of the market and ASC failed to resolve the difficulties
it was experiencing, the Navy would be in real trouble. Navy
representatives thus contracted with Arinc Research Corporation
to act as consultant to ASC Systems. In late 1977, however,
ASC Systems ' production units were failing to pass required
tests. The situation, at that point, was so critical that air-
craft were coming off the production lines without TACAN s
.
Ferry pilots were even carrying TACAN sets with them to allow
acceptance of the new planes.
Consequently, the Navy awarded a sole-source contract to
Hoffman for the third year buy at a price of $17,000. In July
1978, ASC Systems' full production units still had not passed
the required 500 hour Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF) tests,
but, because of the urgent need for the units, the Navy agreed
to accept twenty sets if they could merely pass a fifty hour
burn- in test. In the following month, only two units were
delivered. In September, it was decided to terminate both
contracts. The terms of the settlement (called a discontinua-
tion) were to entail three distinct phases. Phase I allowed
payment of up to $4.3 million in allowable/allocable costs on
the two contracts. In phase II, ASC Systems can submit a
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"termination claim" — to be examined by the Termination Con-
tracting Officer who has the right to determine whether or not
more than the initial $4.3 million is due. In phase III, the
door would be opened for the submission of claims, however,
the total settlement cannot exceed $5.2 million under any
circumstances
.
When questioned about the problems ASC Systems encountered,
Jack Lopes (president of La Pointe) stated that "There is a
lot of information that is not included in the drawings."
/3 : 53/ He also claimed that the delivery schedule was excep-
tionally tight and that he had had insufficient engineering
talent on board to resolve the data package difficulties. An
additional problem noted was that the sub-contractor, responsi-
ble for providing a required voltage regulator micro-circuit,
was providing ASC with units of inadequate quality. Since ASC
did not inspect these units on receipt, the quality problems
were not identified until it was too late.
The bottom line in this case is that second sourcing to
ASC Systems has cost the Navy approximately fifty percent more
than purchase from the original source would have cost. Though,
as noted, it appears obvious that Hoffman's 1975 price was
indeed inflated and in need of trimming, the case illustrates
how second sourcing can result in many problems — especially
where actual qualification of the second source is not achieved
or where its production units cannot pass necessary acceptance
tests. Also in question is the quality of the pre-award survey




TSEC/KG-40 MICROMINIATURIZED KEY GENERATOR — The KG-40 is
utilized for encription and decription of data being trans-
mitted over certain military tactical data links. In 1971,
the Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX) awarded a
development contract to Collins Radio Company of Newport Beach,
California for the KG-40. In 1973, a sole-source letter con-
tract was awarded to Collins for a quantity of 266 serial units
at a price of $22,874 each and 94 parallel units at $33,367
each. Two years later, Collins was again awarded a sole-
source contract for 288 serial units at $20,463 each and 74
parallel units at $30,581. In 1977, believing that Collins
was exploiting its sole-source position, NAVELEX decided to
attempt second sourcing of the KG-40. In coming to the de-
cision to second source that year's contract, NAVELEX did a
careful analysis of the risks and of the quantity projections
for future buys. Additionally, NAVELEX identified several
established and responsible contractors that were believed
capable of performing the contract. NAVELEX also audited and
verified the KG-40 technical data package — finding it suf-
ficiently complete and accurate.
The 1977 contract was awarded competitively to Honeywell
Corporation of Tampa Florida. The contract called for 245
serial units at $8,931 each and 686 parallel units at $11,882
each. Collins' offer had quoted prices of $15,384 and $20,523
for the serial and parallel units respectively. NAVELEX, in
trying to estimate the total savings associated with the second
sourcing of the KG-40, applied three years inflation to the
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unit prices paid to Collins on the previous sole-source buy
and then reduced these figures for the volume of the current
but on a 90 percent learning curve. The savings, so calculated,
are estimated at a healthy $14,800,000. Another directly
measurable benefit of the competition was the fact that NAV-
ELEX was able to increase the quantity of the contract by
approximately two thirds — as a result of the lower prices
paid to Honeywell. Also noteworthy was the significant drop
in Collins' quoted prices (ostensibly as a direct result of the
competititon) .
Though the cost savings achieved are significant, there
are other collateral benefits associated with this particular
second sourcing effort . There are now two fully qualified
producers, of the KG-40; five other sources have been identi-
fied as technically capable of producing the KG-4 (valuable
to future competitions); and, although the technical data
package was not totally flawless, with the aid of models and
careful contracting, the acquisition achieved success.
AIM-7F SPARROW MISSILE — The Sparrow is a medium range air-to-
air missile, with solid state electronics, which guides semi-
actively to a target. Several major components of the Sparrow
have been second sourced or considered for second sourcing and
therefore deserve exploration:
Guidance and Control (G&C) Sections — Development studies
leading to the AIM-7F G&C were initiated with Raytheon in 1964.
The first production contract was awarded to Raytheon
to furnish not onlv the G&C sections but also such
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related items as telemetry, wings, fins, integrated logistic
support (ILS), special tooling, special support equipment,
design data tests, technical support services, and data.
Later awards to Raytheon required such tasks as performance
improvement, G&C design simplification, aircraft interface
and operational testing, and evaluation (including user system
testing and production units). The data package resulting
from this work was considered adequate to permit second source
production of the Sparrow, so, in 1973, a CPFF contract with a
CPAF option was issued to General Dynamics (GD) as a result of
a technical/cost competition to establish GD as a second source
G&C producer. The contract provided for performance in two
stages: (1) data generation in connection with production
preparations ($1,158,233), and (2) manufacture and delivery of
15 first articles and a total of 70 learning quantity produc-
tion units ($21,189,961). First article delivery took place
in May/June 197 6, and, for funding reasons, the learning quan-
tity was later transferred to a separate contract which was
issued as a letter contract with government liability limited
to $8.1 million. Since issuance, however, the cost of those
70 units has risen to $13.5 million. The following will demon-
strate the full production contract profile of the two sources
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When the Navy announced that it intended to second source
the Sparrow, Raytheon prepared a rather interesting analysis
that concluded the need for a 3 4 percent reduction in program
costs before second sourcing could be justified on the basis
of cost savings (assuming a 70/30 split on the purchase of
4570 missiles over a five year period) . Raytheon further
concluded that not until production rates of 2200 missiles per
year were required would second sourcing be "in the national
interest." Instead, Raytheon recommended two alternatives to
second sourcing that it claimed held excellent potential for
savings
:
(1) Allocate funds to provide for multiple sourcing
of additional components beyond those now multi-
ple sourced and by that means achieve the bene-
fits of increased competition at the component
level.
(2) Increase the effort on value engineering. Those
components which can be made more economically
through value engineering changes will benefit
the Navy with a single source as well as with a
second source if one is established. /4:3_/
Among the other arguments against second sourcing the Sparrow
that Raytheon offered were:
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(1) Additional tooling, qualifying, and management
costs associated with second sourcing
(2) Progress along any assumed learning curve is
more rapid in the case of a single source than
when procurement is split.
(3) Additional costs are realized because of pro-
duction verification testing with two manufac-
turers. /4:4_7
Raytheon, then, did not argue that the concept of second sourc-
ing, as such, was invalid — only that it should not be applied
to the Sparrow. Based on production experience with two sources,
Raytheon went on to calculate what it claims is a $108.2 million
cost increase between sole-source and dual source production
of the Sparrow between 1974 and 1973 (including $43.6 million
in learning missile qualification, tooling, and test equipment)
.
NAVAIR's analysis of the AIM-7F second sourcing effort was
somewhat different. By extrapolating along the learning curve
for Raytheon's sole-source production of the Sparrow, NAVAIR
estimated that through FY 1977 Raytheon's price under competi-
tion was $4 2.2 million less than would have been expected.
NAVAIR thus estimated that it would break even on the Sparrow
in FY 1979. Regardless of the economic analysis utilized,
NAVAIR achieved several non-financial benefits from this sec-
ond sourcing (including design improvement and mobilization
base expansion)
.
Mark 58 Model 3-Rocket Motors — Hercules , Incorporated
developed the Sparrow's rocket motors under a fixed price sub-
contract to Raytheon. Subsequently, Hercules became a sole-
source producer for the motors. Prior to fiscal year 1976,
the net cost per unit for the Mk 58 was approximately $8,4 00
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and there appeared little hope that the price would ever go
below $6,500 per copy. At that time, the government repre-
sentatives estimated that second sourcing the motors could
eventually lead to a price of about $5,500. At the same time,
however, Hercules was able to identify a new supplier of metal
parts. That find, coupled with an increase in procurement
quantities for the motors, enabled Hercules to cut its prices
to about $5,400. Since it seemed unlikely that a new source
could attain this lower price, Class Determination & Findings
(CD&F) 77-73 disapproved the request to second source the
motors. Subsequent problems with the metal parts producer and
with Hercules, however, have resulted in NAVAIR reconsidera-
tion of the need to second source. Depending of a reassess-
ment of future needs, a second source may be pursued.
Safety and Arming (S&A) Device-Mark 33 — The Mk 3 3 was
originally developed by Barry L. Miller, Incorporated of
Gardena, California. Consolidation of Miller's activities
as a consequence of the purchase of the Gardena plant and the
subsequent decision to cease production of the S&A device
resulted in the loss of the only qualified production source.
Competitive RFP ' s were utilized to award the 1973 buy of 150
units and first articles to Piqua Engineering of Piqua, Ohio
(FFP contract for $66,240). The 1974/1975 contract require-
ments for 710 units were split under a mobilization base
exception. Four hundred fifty units went to Piqua (FFP con-
tract for $159,6 60) and 260 units went to Raymond Engineering
at a price of $230,980. In FY 1976, the split awarded 300
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units to Piqua and 360 units to Raymond; and, in FY 1977 the
split was 1320 units to Piqua and 362 to Raymond. Although
the FY 1978 award has not been definitized, it is known that
Raymond will receive the largest portion of the award. Un-
fortunately, deliveries over the past few years have been run-
ning about six months behind schedule. NAVAIR is therefore
planning to add a third source in the future.
Experience with the Sparrow has shown that, with some com-
plex systems, the use of a TDP for development of a second
source is feasible; however, the costs associated with such
action may be significant.
TALOS MISSILE — In 1961, Bendix Corporation was awarded a
sole-source contract for the production of the TALOS surface-
to-air missile system. Bendix subsequently produced this
missile for the Navy as a sole-source until 1966. In that year,
the Navy decided to attempt second sourcing of the TALOS . The
"know how" and experience gained by Bendix over the course of
five years of production as a sole-source supplier of the sys-
tem stood them in good stead during the second sourcing effort.
Bendix won the contract for production of the TALOS through
the end of the program in 1968. Of real interest is the anal-
ysis of the costs associated with the procurement of the TALOS
from 1961 to 1968. The original production contract was award-
ed at a per unit cost of $219,000. The learning curve demon-
strated over the next five years was a shallow one (indicating
little improvement) , with the unit price on the 19 65 purchase
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being $160,000. Extrapolating the learning curve, the expected
sole-source price of the 1966 contract totalled $155,000 per
unit. The award price for that contract, however, was only
$92,000 per copy — 41 percent less than projected. The sav-
ings on the 470 missiles purchased under this contract is thus
estimated at $32 million. It seems that even though the ori-
ginal producer won the contract, the mere existence of compe-
tition for the reprocurement extracted significant concessions
in the price charged.
SIDEWINDER MISSILE — The Sidewinder is the name given to a
family of heat seeking air-to-air missiles (AIM- 9 series).
The first Sidewinder was developed at the Naval Ordnance Test
Station (NOTS) in the early 1950 's and was originally produced
in 1954. The fourth version of the missile was developed in
1960 and PHILCO was awarded a contract to help with pilot pro-
duction and data package development for the G&C System. In
1964, the Navy advertised in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD)
for production of the AIM-9D. Raytheon was the low bidder
(40 percent below PHILCO) at $5,000 per missile. Raytheon was
thus awarded a FFP contract for production of the Sidewinder
in January 1965. As a term of the contract, Raytheon had to
prove its ability to produce by manufacturing a quantity of
ten G&C units (4 for standard Navy testing by Raytheon itself
6 for extensive ground, sled, launch, and in-place flight tests
by NOTS) . Raytheon failed in its first attempt to qualify as
a Sidewinder producer but was finally successful three months
later. Although PHILCO had been able to build its missiles
38

from Navy drawings, Raytheon attributed its difficulties to
an inadequate data package. The resulting systems had expe-
rienced low yields, and, as a result, many components had
required extensive rework in order to meet specifications. It
took substantial effort on the part of Raytheon, NOTS , and
NAVAIR before the problems were overcome.
Raytheon claimed that following the requirements of the
data package did not guarantee production of qualified units —
they thus sued the Navy for $14.0 million. The case never got
to court, but, the $6.6 million settlement agreed to by the
Navy tends to support the validity of Raytheon's claim. Sub-
sequently, Raytheon produced several hundred AIM-9D's and
approximately 6,500 of the successor AIM-9Gs. The Navy insti-
tuted competitive second sourcing attempts for the AIM-9G
production lots, but, Raytheon always won the competition.
The next version of the system was the solid state AIM-9H.
With this system, the Navy received developmental assistance
from both Raytheon and General Dynamics. In the following
production phase, Raytheon was awarded a contract for 1,100
missiles and PHILCO-FORD won an additional 7 00 units in compe-
tition with General Dynamics. The Navy, then, offered a con-
tract for an additional 47 missiles which was eventually
awarded to PHILCO-FORD. Of special note, here, is the tactic
utilized by the Navy to preclude recurrence of the data pack-
age problems encountered with the AIM-9D. Provision was made
for the payment to Raytheon (the development contractor) for
the identification and correction of inconsistencies in the
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data package and specifications. The consequent successful
performance was considered to have more than justified the
additional expense incurred. This success also tends to re-
inforce the contention that the data package alone is frequent-
ly inadequate for the transfer of technology whereas interface
between the development/original production contractor and the
second source can assure effective transfer. The fact that
engineering liaison is one of the first prerequisites cited
as necessary for successful commercial licensing makes this
observation all the more convincing.
GAU-8A 30MM AMMUNITION — In 197 3, the Air Force A-10 System
Project Office (SPO) , at the completion of a competitive proto-
type phase, awarded a contract to General Electric Company
(GE) for the GAU-8A gun system. The contract called for full-
scale development and follow-on production of both the gun and
its associated ammunition. GE ' s subcontractof for the ammuni-
tion development and production was Aerojet Ordnance and Manu-
facturing Company. DSARC II, in 1974, directed GE to develop
a second source for ammunition to satisfy mobilization base
and production quantity requirements and to provide for pro-
duction competition. In fact, the concern was voiced that even
if it were impractical to second source the gun itself, a real
cost savings potential existed in the case of the ammunition.
As in the case of razors and razor blades, ammunition, though
not the major implement/tool, accounts for a great deal of the
overall life cycle cost of the system.
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Three major companies competed for the second source con-
tract. Honeywell was finally selected. GE was still the gun
system integrator, but there were to be two ammunition sup-
pliers. Another interesting aspect of this buy was the stip-
ulation that not technological transfer/transfusion between
the two ammunition manufacturers could occur. The only require-
ment was that the ammunition be "form-fit- function" compatible.
This stipulation was enacted because of fears that if Honeywell
were to merely produce the ammunition to Aerojet' s drawings,
both companies would be likely to use the same sources for their
materials — a move that would do nothing to expand the mobili-
zation base even though it would introduce some measure of
price competition.
At the end of full-scale development, the procurement plan
and the DCP specified that initial production buys of the am-
munition would be achieved through the integrating contractor.
It was further averred that it was too early to bring the
second source into production since Honeywell has not yet been
fully qualified. The SPO, however, took a calculated risk and
directed production sub-contracts to both sources in the hope
that Honeywell would soon qualify. A split of 6 percent to
Aerojet and 40 percent to Honeywell was awarded on that initial
production buy.
In 1976, the procurement plan still called for purchase of
the ammunition through the prime integrator, but, the SPO de-
cided to break away from the integrator and buy directly from
the two sub-contractors pursuant to the mobilization base
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exception. The RFP specified a minimum sustaining rate (20
percent of the total buy) — guaranteeing that no less than
that amount would be awarded to either competitor. Above that
minimum level, the offerors were to bid at 16 percent inter-
vals (six separate proposal points) for the entire buy. The
major evaluation criteria were cost and mobilization support
and planning. Cost and pricing data were required and full
field analysis by the Defense Contract Administration Service
(DCAS) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) were ac-
complished, with the results used in the discussions with the
two sources. Eventually a best and final offer was solicited
and both offerors were awarded quantities in excess of the
minimum sustaining rate, indicating a fair degree of competi-
tion had been achieved.
Another interesting aspect of this acquisition was the
requirement that the offerors build a capacity for a defined
peak production (FY8 requirement) . In other words, both had
to have peak year tooling — meaning excess individual capacity,
The two contractors refused to comply at first, however, the
SPO overcame the problem by the use of a special termination
clause entitled "Cost Recovery for Contractor Facilities
Investment." This clause effectively says that if the acquisi-
tion is terminated, the government will assume the cost of the
unammortized book value of the extra capital equipment. At
the same time, there was a great deal of controversy surround-
ing the use of this clause; however, it was determined that
the clause would not constitute a violation of the Anti-
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Deficiency Act since termination of an out-year contract would
also mean cancellation of the instant contract thereby freeing
funds for the termination. The SPO claims that the only real
risk to the government occurs in the first two years. After
that, given that used machine tools are constantly appreciat-
ing, risk is believed to drop to zero.
Among the lessons learned by the Air Force during the FY77
buy were that there were too many proposal points; there should
have been an interpolation method between points; every poten-
tial award point should be incentivized (thereby preventing any
"loading" of the low award points); and, there was no need to
include any subjective evaluation criteria (price alone was a
sufficient criterion for this acquisition)
.
For the FY19 7 8 award, a Dual Competitive Award Methodology
(DCAM) , which incorporated the above lessons learned, was
utilized /Hoppe 19 78/. The results of that buy were truly
noteworthy. Procurement cycle times were reduced dramatically,
and, the savings estimated for that single buy are on the order
of $17.0 million — which allowed a 15 percent increase in
the acquisition quantity to be awarded at a price lower than
had been projected for the original quantity.
This case illustrates how Form-Fit-Function can be used to
effect successful second sourcing of relatively simple systems.
Here, although second sourcing was initiated for mobilization
base reasons, use of contractual language that indemnified the
second source from loss as a result of tooling-up for produc-
tion, resulted in the qualification of two sources who then
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competed vigorously for the larger portions of the awards.
Price concessions thus were realized as a collateral benefit
for follow-on purchases.
CRUISE MISSILE — The Cruise Missile engine is an example
wherein a directed technology licensing (DL.) arrangement is
being utilized to provide a second production source. The
Cruise engine was originally developed by Williams Research
Engineering and Manufacturing. Given the importance of the
Cruise Missile to the national defense effort, it was deter-
mined that alternate sources must be developed to ensure the
integrity of the system against destruction of the sole-source
of manufacture. The Joint Cruise Missile Project Office
(JCMPO) thus tried to enduce Williams to agree to a licensing
agreement whereby a second source for the manufacture of the
engine could become qualified. When all attempts to secure
such an agreement failed, it was decided that the requirement
for an alternate engine be advertized in the Commerce Business
Daily and draft RFP ' s be submitted to industry.
Faced with the development of an alternative engine,
Williams finally agreed to the licensing of its engine. The
project office told Williams to consider a total of six manu-
facturers as potential second sources. Since the government
believed that more than enough adequate production facilities
already existed in the market, it was stipulated that no new
facilities were to be constructed in connection with the
contract. The first source recommended by Williams was re-
jected by the government evaluation team; however, Teledyne,
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which was determined to have sufficient capacity, technical
competence (since they were presently producing Harpoon Mis-
sile engines), and an excellent engineering staff, was approv-
ed as a second source by the government.
The JCMPO is presently negotiating a definitive licensing
agreement. Among the important factors being addressed are
sharing arrangements, royalties, and, where applicable, main-
tenance. The fact that both sources will be capable of compet-
ing for both manufacture and maintenance of the Cruise missile
engine has stimulated optimism about the potential for signif-
icant cost savings downstream.
The Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is expected to be
produced under a Leader-Follower concept (under a mobilization
base exception) . Two alternative methods of selecting the
follower are being considered: (1) competitive selection of
the follower, or (2) selection, by the government, of the un-
successful development offeror as the follower. One important
element in the source selection process will be the technology
transfer plan of the offerors. This plan is to have three
elements: a master schedule for follower development (complete
with meaningful contract events); a statement of work outlining
what the leader must do to make the follower capable of produc-
ing forty percent of the contract requirement; and, a proposed
work task statement for the follower. The initial contract
period for the leader-follower arrangement is fiscal year 80/81.
The first year's technology transfer effort is to be directed
at completely indoctrinating the follower (acting as a sub-
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contractor) in the leader's manufacturing approach and at
preparing the follower for pilot production.
During the next year, the follower still operates as a
subcontractor and the technology transfer effort is designed
to result in limited production of the complete system. A
capability must be developed such that the follower is cap-
able of producing between 40 and 60 percent of the FY 19 82
purchase
.
In FY 1982, it is projected that the follower will be
tasked with producing 40 percent of the leader company's pro-
duction requirement — still in a subcontractor capacity. In
case the follower encounters difficulties, the leader can re-
duce this quantity in consonance with the level of production
capability demonstrated by the follower.
In all subsequent buys, awards will be made under full
competition with government contracts being awarded to both
sources. Government tooling will be shared by both contractors
with a minimum of 40 percent going to either contractor. Buy-
out (winner take all award) may be executed at any time by the
government. Although this acquisiton is in its early stages,
the procedures being utilized appear instructive. Another
good example of the use of the leader-follower technique is
found in shipbuilding contracts. Much has been devoted to
this program in the literature /e.g. ASN (MRA&L) 1978/ so it
will not be covered in this study.
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AIRBORNE SELF-PROTECTION JAMMER (ASPJ) — The U. S. Naval
Research Laboratories originally designed and developed the
ASPJ with the stated objective of providing all Navy tactical
aircraft with an acceptable probability of success and surviv-
ability during the 1980' s and beyond. It is currently sched-
uled for the F-18/A-18, F-14A, EA-6B, A-6E, and AV-8B aircraft
as. a minimum. Eventually, as many as four thousand aircraft
could carry these units, making this program worth some $2.0
billion.
One of the objectives of the program is to have a high
initial production rate that will be maintained for a con-
siderable period of time. No single company could handle the
projected production schedule; and, at the same time, the
potential dangers of sole-source acquisition make the idea of
production competition especially attractive on a project of
this magnitude. NAVAIR, thus, introduced a relatively new
concept for this acquisition — contractor teaming. Presently,
two teams have been selected to produce engineering development
models: ITT/Westinghouse and Sanders/Northrup . Following a
critical design review in January 1980, a single team (both
members of which will be fully qualified producers of the
entire ASPJ system) will be selected and production quantities
will be awarded to the members of that winning team. Quanti-
ties awarded to the individual team members will be determined
on the basis of an award competition between the two former
team mates. The split itself will be determined on the basis
of cost to the government — the combination that is cheapest
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overall. Initial production deliveries are scheduled to begin
in mid-1980.
The teaming concept is an intellectually intriguing one.
The question remains whether or not two historical adversaries
can or will engage in the full interchange of information and
technology necessary to enable both to establish fully compe-
tent independent production lines capable of producing the
entire system. Since the resultant product will have been co-
developed, the award criteria for production buys will hinge
on price, quality, and delivery performance. To date, prob-
lems encountered encompass such factors as management coordina-
tion, proprietary data and process considerations, division of
labor, and other such parochial concerns. It is yet to be
determined whether or not the incentives for cooperation ($2
billion in combined sales) will be able to overshadow the self-
ish concerns of the individual team members.
The enormity of this project will most definitely have an
adverse effect on any losing team — in fact it has been postu-
lated that the Electronics Warfare market will necessarily
shrink because many of the losing contractors will be unable
to recover from the loss of this contract. Perhaps the advan-
tages of cooperation, in this case, are too overpowering to be
overlooked. One government representative expressed sincere
concern, however , that the lead member of any team will have
significant incentive to ensure that the other member is never
quite fully equal to the leader — thereby securing for that
leader a competitive advantage on future procurements . Regard-
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less of the outcome, teaming is a stimulating concept and ASPJ
should be studied carefully in order to determine the viability
of the method for future projects.
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V. THE SECOND SOURCING METHOD SELECTION MODEL (SSMSM)
PREFACE — As outlined in Harvey T. Gordon's memorandum of
13 February 1979 /Appendix p_7, there are a number of techniques
for establishing a second source for production of a weapon
system. The process of deciding which, if any, of these
techniques to use should follow a logical series of steps:
(1) specific objectives/policy goals to be fulfilled must be
clearly stated and understood, (2) a determination must be made
as to the adaptability of the project in question to second
sourcing, and, (3) the acquisition alternative that will best
achieve the stated goals must be selected. Mr. Gordon went on
to delineate seven potential reasons for establishing a second
source:
(1) broadening the production base
(2) evening out the flucutation in the defense industry
which leads to feast or famine situations for indiv-
idual firms
(3) achieving savings through increased competition
(4) achieving superior equipment through increased
competition
(5) facilitating NATO participation as co-producers
or through offsetting co-production as sub-
contractors
(6) facilitating the attainment of socio-economic
goals by increased award to minority and small
business contractors, and,
(7) preserving competition for the sake of competition
per se.
It is fully conceivable that some of these objectives may,
in fact, be in conflict. If such is the case, a determination
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must be made as to the relative importance of said objectives
so that those having the greatest impact may be considered as
controlling.
Once the reasons for second sourcing have been established,
this chapter presents a model which may be used by the Program
Manager and/or the Contracting Officer in determining (1)
whether or not the generation of a second source is feasible,
and (2) which second sourcing methodology is best suited to
the given acquisition situation. It is intended that this
chapter be of sufficient breadth and depth that it can stand
alone — apart from the rest of the thesis. As a stand alone
document, the chapter can be extracted from the thesis and
used as a decision tool by Program Managers faced with second
sourcing decisions. The Second Sourcing Method Selection Model
(SSMSM) was developed jointly by this researcher and LCDR
Benjamin R. Sellers, SC, USN who will also be utilizing the
model (under the title: Competitive Method Selection Model)
in his forthcoming thesis entitled, "Competition in Major Weap-
on System Acquisition."
The following topics will be discussed in the remainder of
this chapter: methods of generating a second source; variables
affecting the second sourcing decision; and, the model itself —
including its format, the rationale behind the effectiveness
factors incorporated therein, and, a discussion of the actual
use of the model.
METHODS OF GENERATING SECOND SOURCES — This section discusses
five methods which can be used to provide two or more sources
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for second source production of a weapon system. Each method
has advantages and disadvantages. The five methods to be des-
cribed in the following pages are: form- fit- function,
technical data package, directed licensing, leader-follower,
and contractor teams. It should be emphasized that, where
possible, the decision of whether or not to pursue second
sourcing be made as early as possible in the life of the pro-
gram so that the development contracts can be structured to
facilitate the technology transfer which is essential to pro-
duction competition. If the program manager waits until the
design selection is made to consider production competition,
he will encounter stiff and possibly insurmountable opposition
from the "other half" of the bilateral monopoly which he has
created.
Form-Fit-Function (F ) . This method involves introduc-
tion of a second production source without need for a technical
data package or for interaction between production sources
.
The second source is provided with functional specifications
regarding such parameters as overall performance, size, weight,
external configuration and mounting provisions, and, interface
requirements. This is the classic "black box" concept where it
is not necessary to define the internal workings of the pro-
duct. It is used frequently for the acquisition of expendable
non-repairable items where the ability of the system to per-
form as required is not dependent on what is inside the "box."
The method does not work well where field level maintenance
of the system is envisioned since the provision of non-identi-
cal items makes stockage of repair parts and training of
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maintenance personnel potentially insurmountable problems.
These objections can sometimes be overcome by the use of war-
ranty provisions, renewable maintenance contract provisions
and/or provisions for contractor services to set up the neces-
sary government maintenance capabilities to support the equip-
ment throughout its lifetime. The advantages of acquisition
3by F specifications include:
(1) Detailed design responsibility is clearly assigned
to the contractor. If the item fails to meet speci-
fications, the contractor must alter the design until
specified operation is achieved.
(2) There is no design data package for the government
to procure or maintain.
(3) Requirements for technical capability within the
government are minimized. This is the path of least
involvement on the part of the government in contract-
ing, contract monitoring, etc.
(4) Standardization can be achieved among multiple sour-
ces through two-way interchangeability of products
which may differ internally. These multiple sources
may be exercised simultaneously.
The disadvantages include the following:
(1) Each procurement contains a development effort unless
the product is off-the-shelf modified. Some time and
money are involved each time the item is procured for
engineering, changes, production learning curves, and
debugging.
(2) Each time a procurement is made, the contractor who
has the least appreciation for the total significance
of the specification and the effort to accomplish the
task is likely to be the low bidder. This means the
source selection criteria must be very carefully con-
structed to include mechanisms to demonstrate con-
tractor awareness of critical elements as well as his
capabilities to produce the item.
(3) The costs of repair parts will tend to become exces-
sive when a contractor realizes that he is in a
somewhat sole-source position with respect to his
equipment unless the total maintenance for the ser-
vice life of the equipment is provided for in the
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procurement contract while competition is still being
maintained.
(4) Careful specification of all external parameters is
required to ensure true interchangeability . /5:vi-10/
Technical Data Package (TDP) . This method involves utili-
zation of a stand alone technical data package to solicit pro-
posals from manufacturers who may not have been involved in
initial development of the system or in initial production.
Ordinarily this is accomplished through the invocation of an
appropriate data rights clause in the original R&D or initial
production contract. Even where no such clause exists, it may
be possible to buy the data package subsequent to production.
In the absence of such a clause, the original developer/pro-
ducer may consider the design, or portions of it, to be pro-
prietary; and, hence, may be reluctant to provide a complete
TDP to the government. The cost of procuring the data package
subsequent to initial production may thus be prohibitive.
This method assumes that the data package alone is sufficient
to allow production of the system by alternate manufacturers
.
Although it has been successfully utilized, there are frequent
examples where significant difficulties have been faced in
applying the method. Its chief attraction is that the exist-
ence of an adequate data package can result in the maintenance
of a competitive environment throughout the life of the
project.
Although theoretically sound, this method is perhaps the
most hazardous of all the second sourcing methodologies. It
is not well suited for use with highly complex systems or
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systems with unstable design or technologies. Experience has
shown that drawings and specifications alone are often insuf-
ficient to secure effective transfer of manufacturing tech-
nology. "The critical factors may be craftsman's skills,
ingenious processes, 'tricks of the trade' and esoteric shop
practices that cannot be reduced to formal or informal paper."
/6 : 837 Once the data package has been accepted from the
developer, the government effectively guarantees its accuracy
and adequacy to the second source. If defects are subsequently
discovered in the TDP , as is almost always the case, the second
source may have the basis for a claim against the government.
Some methods of minimizing this particular problem include:
requiring the producer of the data package to certify its
adequacy; pre-production evaluation by the second source; and,
the use of a latent/patent defects clause in the contract with
the second source, to name a few. The use of a latent/patent
defects clause, however, is experiencing significant disfavor,
because it is being maintained by many legal representatives
that the mere existence of such a clause is tantamount to gov-
ernmental acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the package.
This puts the government in a precarious legal position in the
event of subsequent claims.
There are other problems associated with the TDP approach.
Although there are those who maintain that if the system was
developed under government contract, there should be no pro-
prietary rights to any of the data; the fact remains that much
of the data required for successful technology transfer may be
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encumbered with claims that the information is proprietary.
These problems center on the definition of "proprietary data"
and "trade secrets" and on whether or not the government has
the right to require the dissemination of such information.
A complete discussion of these questions is beyond the scope
of this study, however, they are discussed in detail in a Rand
Corporation report by James W. McKie entitled "Proprietary
Rights and Competition in Procurement." A 1975 report of the
National Materials Advisory Board of the National Academy of
Sciences entitled "The Effectiveness of the Army Technical
Data Package in Technology Transfer for Procurement" provides
valuable information regarding the use of the TDP as a vehicle
for generating production competition.
The major advantages of second sourcing via the TDP
include
:
(1) The TDP can be used repeatedly in maintaining a
competitive atmosphere throughout the production
phase of the acquisition.
(2) Once the TDP is validated and proven adequate
for production of the system, the mechanics of
second sourcing are relatively simple. There need
not be any contact between production sources and
it is even possible to eliminate the original source
altogether.
The primary disadvantages of the method are:
(1) It may be exceptionally difficult to obtain a complete
and accurate TDP that is free of encumberances and
which, when followed, will yield a qualified product.
(2) The procuring authority must have access to whatever
"in-house" talent is necessary to ensure resolution
of data package problems.
(3) Even where drawings and specifications are complete
and accurate, transfer of complex technology is often
impossible without the benefit of engineering liaison
between sources of production.
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(4) Technological differences between companies (e.g.,
differing process methodologies) may be sucft that
the second source does not have the capability of
performance in accordance with the data package.
Directed Licensing (PL) . In its pure form, this method
involves the inclusion of a clause in the early development
contract allowing the government to re-open competition for
follow-on production, select a winner, and appoint him as a
licensee. Then, in return for royalty and/or technical assist-
ance fees, the licensor (development contractor) will provide
the licensee with manufacturing data and technical assistance
to help the second source become a successful producer.
As used in many current acquisitions, licensing agreements
are also being negotiated where no provision for such an agree-
ment was included in the development contract. Such arrange-
ments may, however, be considerably more costly than those
specified in the original development contracts. There has
also been a trend toward allowing the licensor to choose his
own licensee — subject to government approval.
This method involves not only the transfer of data from
the developer to the second source, but also provides for the
transfer of manufacturing "know-how." The developer is nor-
mally awarded the first production contract and is contract-
ually bound to licensing another contractor for production of
an unspecified number of future systems. In fact, the provis-
ions of the licensing agreement (including royalty fees; if
any) should normally become one of the source selection cri-
teria used in choosing the winning developer.
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Directed Licensing seeks to solve technology transfer
problems associated with the TDP methodology by providing for
necessary engineering and manufacturing liaison between the
sources which is then incentivized through the royalty
procedure. It derives its attractiveness from the fact that
subsequent reprocurements can be competed — in whole or in
part — even where complex systems technology is involved.
The technique of commercial licensing has been used success-
fully in industry for years — especially by firms desiring
the sale of their products in foreign markets. In fact, more
than 10,000 aircraft have been manufactured by companies that
_
were not involved in the original R&D work. /Johnson 1968/
Promising as directed licensing may appear, it does entail
the incursion of significant identifiable costs. If the
royalty fee is unreasonable, the benefits of competing the
production buys will be significantly reduced. If the develop-
er can provide an acceptable product at a lower price than
could a second source, however, the government need net exer-
cise the licensing option. The mere threat of competitive
options may be a sufficient incentive for the developer to
maintain efficiency and keep costs to a minimum.
For a more detailed discussion of directed licensing
examination of the Rand Corporation report by Gregory A. Carter
entitled "Directed Licensing: An Evaluation of a Proposed
Technique for Reducing the Procurement Cost of Aircraft"
/Carter 1974/ is invited. In 1969, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) performed an evaluation of the feasibility of
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implementing directed licensing. The resultant report /Comp-
troller General 1969/ cites several potential problems with
the technique and concludes that directed licensing would not
provide a workable solution to the problem of reducing the
cost of major systems; The potential problems cited by GAO
are addressed in the Carter article and are considered critical
to understanding and evaluating the potential effectiveness of
directed licensing.
The advantages of directed licensing include:
(1) The potential for production competition is maintained
throughout the acquisition cycle.
(2) The government need not become closely involved with
the actual transfer of technology between sources
.
(3) Quantity production decisions and source of supply
decisions can be postponed until later in the
acquisition process.
(4) The designer is provided with protection as to
how, or in what markets, the second source is to be
licensed to sell the product; and, the designer is
compensated for each item produced by the second
source.
The disadvantages of directed licensing include:
(1) The existence of royalty and technical assistance
fees increases the cost of the acquisition and could
be prohibitive.
(2) It may be difficult to achieve the necessary de-
gree of cooperation between alternative production
sources, and the licensee may have little recourse
against half-hearted cooperation on the part of the
licensor.
(3) Some contractors may bid on projects simply to ob-









Leader-Follower — The DAR defines leader- follower as "an
extraordinary procurement technique under which the developer
or sole producer of an item or system (the leader company)
furnishes manufacturing assistance and know-how or otherwise
enables a follower company to become a source of supply for
the item or system." DAR limits the use of this technique to
situations when all of the following conditions are present:
(1) the leader company possesses the necessary produc-
tion know-how and is able to furnish the requisite
assistance to the follower;
(2) no source of supply (other than a leader company)
would be able to meet the government's requirements
without the assistance of a leader company;
(3) the assistance required of the leader company is
limited to that which is essential to enable the
follower company to produce the items ; and
(4) the government reserves the right to approve contracts
between the leader and follower companies.
DAR suggests the following three methods for establishing
a leader- follower relationship (no preference is indicated as
to which method should be used)
:
(1) One procedure is to award a prime contract to an
established source (leader company) in which the
source is obligated to subcontract a designated
portion of the total number of end items required
to a specified subcontractor (follower company)
and to assist the follower company in that pro-
duction.
(2) A second procedure is to award a prime contract to the
leader company for the requisite assistance to the
follower company, and another prime contract to the
follower company for production of the items.
(3) A third procedure is to award a prime contract to
the follower company for the items, under which the
follower company is obligated to subcontract with a




Leader- follower procurements have been undertaken in the
past more for the purpose of meeting delivery schedule require-
ments due to the lack of capacity of a single source, rather
than for increasing competition. However, since the concept
encompasses dual or parallel production lines, splitting the
award quantity on a high-low percentage basis would still
insure a significant degree of competition for the annual
production contracts
.
The advantages of leader-follower are similar to those of
directed licensing in that:
1. It provides a technique for transferring part or all
of the production of a complex system to a second
source.
2. Competition can be utilized to determine the acquisi-
tion split awarded to each qualified producer even
when two sources are maintained throughout the
acquisition cycle.
3. It has been used successfully in the past.
The major disadvantage of the leader- follower technique
is
:
1. "Leader" companies may be less enthusiastic about this
technique than directed licensing because leader-
follower contains no royalty provisions for proprie-
tary data nor does it provide some of the protection
that may be present in a licensing arrangement.
Contractor Teams . A recent innovation in the generation of
production competition is represented by the contractor teams
which are currently competing in the design selection phase
of the Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) system. In the
solicitation for the design of the ASPJ, the Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) required that offerors form teams of two or
more contractors. This acquisition strategy envisions the
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award of a production contract to the team which eventually
wins the design competition. Following initial production,
both contractors are expected to have the capability to pro-
duce the complete system. DAR provides a brief discussion of
contractor teams including a policy statement on the use of
teaming arrangements. The implication of DAR is that the
government will generally permit contractor teams, but it
does not mention actions by the government to require the
formation of teams as was done on the ASPJ. DAR does mention
that some contractor teaming arrangements may violate anti-
trust statutes. The program manager and/or the contracting
officer must be sensitive to this, possibility in order to
prevent its occurrence.
The advantages of requiring contractor teams are:
(1) It should prevent most of the problems in qualifying
a second source, since at least two contractors were
involved in the design and initial production.
(2) It should also reduce or eliminate the feeling on
the part of either contractor that trade secrets or
proprietary data are being given away to outside
sources
.
(3) No liaison fees or royalties will be involved in
the establishment of the second source.
(4) The design talent of two contractors will be brought
to bear on each proposal, thereby increasing the
opportunity for successful and innovative designs.
(5) It provides a vehicle for increasing the capacity of
the industrial base.
The disadvantages of contractor teams are:
(1) The design phase may be more costly since at least
two contractors are involved on every proposal.
(2) It requires a great deal of cooperation and coordina-




VARIABLES AFFECTING THE PRODUCTION COMPETITION DECISION —
The selection of the "best" method for generating production
competition will vary depending on a number of factors extant
in any acquisition program. The existence of these factors
(i.e., decision variables) presents the program manager with
a difficult, multi-faceted decision situation. He must con-
sider the strengths and weaknesses of each competitive method
in relation to the influence of the variables in his acquisi-
tion program.
In order to assist the program manager in logically and
systematically selecting the optimal competitive method, an
evaluative model is needed. The model should rank each of the
competition techniques against each of the decision variables.
Then, by objectively evaluating the influence of each of the
variables, the program manager will be led to an optimal choice
of which method of competition to use in his program. At a
minimum, one or two of the methods may be shown to be clearly
superior to the others, thereby reducing the complexity of
the decision situation.
The next section presents such a model. Before describing
the model, however, it is necessary to define the decision
variables on which the model is based and to describe the gen-
eral impact which each of the variables has on the feasibility
of production competition.
SECOND SOURCE DECISION VARIABLES —
Quantity to be Procured — The ultimate quantity to be
procured and the rate at which the government will place orders
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for production will have a significant effect on the adapt-
ability of the project to second sourcing. In general, the
larger the quantity to be procured, the more feasible it is to
have production competition. The ideal situation for second
sourcing would entail large quantities needed at a rapid rate
over a number of years. Any deviation from this ideal will
tend to lessen the cost effectiveness of generating a second
source.
Duration of Production — As alluded to above, it is gen-
erally true that the longer the duration of the projected
production, the more feasible second sourcing becomes. For
example, suppose the production phase is to be only four years
long, and it takes at least two years to bring a second source
on line (including source selection, start-up of the plant,
and production of a learning/qualification quantity) . In this
case, there would be only a year or so left for production of
the system by the second source, in which case second sourcing
would be an inappropriate strategy.
Slope of the Learning Curve — The flatter the slope of
the learning curve, the more adaptable the project becomes to
second sourcing. With a steep learning curve, the more units
produced by the original source before a second source is
brought "on-line," the more unlikely it becomes that the
second source can effectively compete with that original




Complexity of the System — The more complex the system,
the more essential is the need for cooperation and liaison
between the two production sources, and the less adaptable is
the project to second sourcing.
State-of-the-Art — If the technology employed in the sys-
tem is at the leading edge of (or advances) the state-of-the-
art, it becomes unlikely that a second source will be able to
produce the system without significant difficulties — probably
necessitating significant cooperation between the original
and second source producers.
Other Potential Government or Commercial Applications —
If the system has wide applicability for other government or
commercial uses, the original developer is more likely to
demand some form of protection for his "trade secrets" or
"proprietary data" than if the market for the product is very
limited. On the other hand, the interest of potential second
sources in the project will be stimulated if other applications
for the hardware exist.
Degree of Privately Funded R&D — The greater the degree
of privately funded R&D on which the design is based, the more
reluctant the developer will be to release his design to a
second source. This is particularly true if no restrictions
are placed on the use of the design by that second source.
Cost of Unique Tooling/Facilities — As special tooling/
facilities requirements and costs increase, the number of
potential second sources decreases and the probability of being
able to bring a second source on line in a cost effective
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manner decreases. Also pertinent will be other start up and
non-recurring costs, including first article acceptance test-
ing. The higher these costs become, the more difficult it is
to amortize them over the duration of the acquisition.
Maintenance Concept to be Employed — Second sourcing, with
its multiple producers, can have significant impact on the
maintenance considerations of the system. Wherever two sys-
tems of the same type are non-identical, the ability to support
those systems with field level repair parts and maintenance
personnel becomes diluted.
Cost of Transferring Unique Government Owned Tooling/
Equipment — If any unique government-owned tooling is diffi-
cult or expensive to transfer from one contractor to another,
it may be necessary to provide duplicate sets of tooling in
order for a second source to become a viable competitor. The
cost of transferring tooling, then, can work in the same man-
ner as the cost of the tooling itself in inhibiting the adapt-
ation of the project to second sourcing.
Contractor Capacity — If the original producer does not
have the ability to produce needed quantities of the system
according to the required delivery schedule, development of a
second source may become mandatory. Lack of adequate capacity
may thus be considered a controlling factor in deciding for
second sourcing. If, on the other hand, the original pro-
ducer has sufficient or even excess capacity, reduction in
the production quantities awarded may significantly increase
the costs of production through increased overhead.
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Production Lead Time — The longer the production lead
time, the longer it will take to bring a second source on line
and the less appealing becomes the second sourcing option.
Contractual Complexity — The more complex the original
production contract (e.g., Life Cycle Cost parameters, Design
to Cost considerations, Warranty Agreements) the less adaptable
to second sourcing the project becomes. With warranties, for
instance, it may be necessary to keep two sources capable of
performing warranty work throughout the life of the project —
even though a production buy-out may have been exercised at
some point in the acqusitiion.
Amount and Type of Subcontracting — If the number of quali-
fied subcontractors is limited and the degree of reliance on
those subcontractors is necessarily heavy, the benefits to be
realized through second sourcing are necessarily lessened.
THE MODEL — The Second Sourcing Method Selection Model (SSMSM)
shown on the following pages is heuristic in nature. Its ob-
jective is to provide a logical and systematic framework for
evaluating the applicability of each of the competitive methods
in light of the variables present in the acquisition situation.
The end result of the evaluation process will (at best) be the
selection of the optimal competitive technique. At worst, use
of the model should serve to eliminate one or more techniques
from further consideration. In that case, the decision situa-
tion will have been simplified and certain of the variables
should emerge as being critical, thereby, suggesting the areas
which need further investigation and/or consideration.
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Format of the Model — It should be noted that the model
is actually two models. The pre-production model (page 77) is
for use by the program manager who is developing his overall
acquisition strategy. In other words, the program second
sourcing decision is being made at some point prior to DSARC II.
The post-production model (page 78 ) is for use by a program
manager who is already in the production phase of the program
and is considering the generation of a second source for part
or all of the remaining life of the acquisition. It is neces-
sary to differentiate between the two situations because the
effectiveness factors assigned to each of the methods change
significantly depending upon whether the second sourcing de-
cision is being made early or late in the program's life cycle.
The SSMSM lists the fourteen decision variables vertically
on the left. Each of these variables is divided into two or
three categories (e.g., high-medium- low, yes-no) to allow the
model to be tailored to the refinements of a given acquisition
situation. Across the top of the model are listed the second
sourcing methodologies. It should be noted that the five
3
methods, (F , TDP, DL, LP, and CT) , when placed in that order,
represent a line of continuum with respect to the degree of
cooperation and contact needed between the original developer
and the second source. For example, second sourcing on the
3basis of F or TDP involves no need for contact between the
two contractors. At the other extreme is CT which represents
a formal alliance between two or more contractors. Recognizing
this relationship among the methods provides a better under-
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standing of the way each method relates to the variables and
to the other methods. Understanding this relationship may
even lead to effective modification or hybridization of the
techniques not previously considered.
Effectiveness Factors — The model rates the effective-
ness of each of the methods with respect to each of the de-
cision variables. A simple three point system of "+", "0",
or "-" is used to denote whether a given method is particularly
strong, neutral, or weak with respect to each of the variables.
An "X" is used to denote a situation where the use of a given
method is particularly inappropriate, or, to caution that par-
ticular care should be used in applying a given method in that
situation. A "*", on the other hand, indicates that the method
is particularly well suited to the situation under considera-
tion.
The three point system is used because of the non-quanti-
fiable nature of the model. A wider scale (-5 to +5, for
example) would merely invite argument over the rankings assign-
ed and would detract from the main purpose of the model. The
primary value of the model is that it serves as a guide to the
subjective decision process and that it gives recognition to
the differences among the methods. It is not intended to pro-
vide an elaborate quantification scheme which removes the need
for experience and judgement.
DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL'S WEIGHTINGS —
Quantity — Low production quantities make successful
second sourcing difficult, at best. None of the methods will
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work well under such circumstances. By the time the second
source is qualified as a producer, the savings potential on
the remaining quantities will probably not justify the asso-
ciated expense. In the post-production phase, the difficulties
usually associated with the qualification of a second source
through the use of a TDP make that method especially undesir-
able; whereas, the relative simplicity of the F technique
yields the greatest probability of success when low quantities
are involved. Only where the magnitude of the system and its
price are truly significant will small quantities justify the
use of the DL, LF , or CT methods. As quantities rise, the
viability of all the methods increases. Because there is a
dilution of the total quantities to be produced subsequent to
initial production, the pre-production portion of the model
appears slightly more favorable than the post production por-
tion with respect to quantity.
Duration of Production — The rationale provided in the
discussion on quantity also pertains to the duration of produc-
tion variable. Any attempt to qualify a second production
source will take time, and, the likelihood of success decreases
as the time required for the qualification of a second source
increases. DL and LF techniques are therefore especially un-
suitable since both assume original production by the develop-
ment contractor.
Slope of the Learning Curve — If the demonstrated learn-
ing curve of the original producer is flat, all methods are
worthy of consideration. Where steep learning is exhibited,
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the original producer will experience a significant competi-
tive advantage for future awards; and, if cost savings is the
object of the second sourcing effort, it may be extremely
difficult to justify going to an alternate source. It should
be noted, however, that a steep learning curve might also
indicate that the base price was unrealistically high in the
first place — resulting in an unjustifiably inflated original
award
.
Technical Complexity — DL, LF , and CT are techniques
that are designed to provide the necessary liaison and coop-
eration to assure effective transfer of even highly complex
technology. CT is especially effective under such circumstan-
ces since the teams can be constituted such that complementary
technologies can be brought together. When production by an
original source has begun, CT, in the pure sense is not possi-
ble, however, a team of competitors might be attracted to vie
for follow-on production contracts. Problems with TDP ' s are
often insurmountable without costly and labor intensive effort
when high levels of technology are involved. It is not impos-
sible to use this method in such cases, however, extreme care
must be exercised to ensure the adequacy of the data package
and to ensure the choice of a second source which is likely to
be capable of overcoming data package problems. The simpler
the system, the more probable becomes the success of all the
methods
.
State-of-the-Art — The same rationale provided for the
technical complexity factor applies to the state-of-the-art
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variable. The more liaison between the production sources,
the greater is the chance of successful technology transfer —
transfer of state-of-the-art technology by data packages alone
is virtually impossible.
Other Government and Commercial Applications — Where
there are expected to be significant alternative uses for the
system, the original producer may be expected to claim or gen-
erate legal or quasi-legal barriers (patents, trade secrets,
proprietary data) to the dissemination of his design unless he
is handsomely compensated or is given specific protection in
the form of limitations placed on the use of his design. DL
provides royalty payments to the developer/original producer;
3
F does not require the transfer of data; and CT arrangements
specify that both members of the team will be capable of pro-
ducing the end item so these methods facilitate the award of
alternate follow-on production contracts. With a TDP , the
post-production use of the method is less attractive since the
original producer will usually have proof of alternative uses
rather than conjectured alternatives.
Degree of Privately Runded R&D — If the contractor's
privately funded R&D led to the development of a design that
the government selects for production, it is almost certain
that a significant amount of proprietary data will be included
in the design package. In such a circumstance, he is likely
to vehemently resist any attempt to disseminate that informa-
tion. With DL and CT methodologies his rights will be protec-
ted or he will receive compensation for the use of his data so
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his resistance will be somewhat less violent. Although it is
difficult to imagine a situation wherein all the R&D would be
privately funded, the existence of a single critical process
that is truly proprietary will greatly lessen the chance of
second sourcing success.
Special Tooling Costs — When the cost of special tool-
ing is significant, the willingness of potential competitors
to enter the market — without provision of government-owned
tooling or unless the quantity and duration of production is
sufficient to allow ammortization of the costs of such tooling
— is limited. Regardless, the original producer will have a
real competitive advantage where high tooling costs are in-
cluded. Even where the tooling is government-owned, the poten-
tial disruption associated with the transfer of the tooling
may be unacceptable — requiring duplicate tooling to be pro-
vided. A contractor teaming arrangement, subsequent to initial
production, might result in the need for three separate sets
of tooling — making such an arrangement particularly un-
palatable.
Cost of Transferring Unique Government-Owned Tooling —
Shifting of production units from one source to another implies
one of two alternatives: (1) shifting the government-owned
tooling, or, (2) providing additional — perhaps excess —
capacity in the form of duplicate tooling and equipment. Of
course, where mobilization base considerations are controlling,
the latter is mandated. Also, where the cost of buying dup-
licate tooling is less than or equal to the cost of transfer-
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ring the tooling from year to year (including disruption costs)
,
this variable may be eliminated from consideration. Since the
cost of transferring tooling and equipment has an equivocal
affect on all methodologies, the weighting assigned to each is
identical.
Capacity of the Developer/Original Producer — When the
original producer does not have sufficient capacity to allow
him to manufacture the desired systems in required quantities,
at required quality and to deliver those systems in accordance
with the prescribed schedule, any of the methods may be con-
sidered. Where sufficient or excess capacity exists with the
original producer, it may be more costly (especially in the
short run) to second source than it is to remain with the
original source alone. Cutting the quantities awarded to a
source, with existing excess capacity, usually means that the
fixed overhead must still be spread over the now lower quanti-
ties — yielding higher prices.
Maintenance Requirements — Where field level maintenance
needs are relatively insignificant, second source production
presents little or no problem. As the need for field mainten-
ance increases, however, the non-identical nature of second
sourced systems becomes more difficult to accommodate. F sys-
tems usually exhibit the least degree of commonality and there-
fore cause the most severe maintenance and support problems.
Production Lead Time — The longer the lead time asso-
ciated with the production of the system, the more difficult
it becomes to bring alternative producers on line early enough
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to realize the potential advantages of second sourcing. This
holds true regardless of the second sourcing method chosen.
Contractual Complexity — The more complex the contract-
ual relationship between the original producer and the govern-
ment, the greater are the barriers to successful second sourc-
ing. Life Cycle Cost parameters, Reliability Improvement War-
ranties and other contractual complexities become difficult to
enforce when dealing with multiple sources. In fact, the cost
I
of maintaining multiple source warranties may become prohibitive.
Degree of Subcontracting — Where there is a great deal of
subcontracting or where the number of firms capable of perform-
ing subcontracting functions is limited, the advantages of
second sourcing the prime contract will be diluted. Given the
fact that the primes may be forced to compete for the services
of the same subcontractors, or use the materials of a single
supplier, the prices may even rise with second sourcing.
USE OF THE MODEL — As stated earlier, the model is not design-
ed to be a strictly quantified decision-making device wherein
the evaluation factors for each method are summed and the
method with the highest "score" is selected. The correct use
of the model requires the use of judgment at every step. The
first (and possibly most difficult) step is to evaluate the
acquisition situation in terms of the decision variables
(that is, to determine whether the acquisition will cover high,
medium, or low quantities; whether technical complexity is
high, medium or low; and to make similar judgements about the
other variables) . The program manager is encouraged to add
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new variables to the list as he sees the need for them. The
next step is to evaluate the second sourcing methods in rela-
tion to the variables which exist in a program — realizing
that some variables will be more important than others. One
method may turn out to dominate all the others or there may-
be more than one feasible method. Additional judgement will,
therefore, be required. It may even be possible to allow the
competing contractors to have an input to the decision process.
If the model can simplify and guide the thought process so that
(1) all significant variables are recognized and objectively
evaluated, (2) clearly inappropriate second sourcing strategies
are eliminated, and (3) an appropriate method is selected, then
the model will have served its purpose.
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Although second sourcing is a term familiar to most ac-
quisition personnel, there is no generally accepted definition
of the term. It is therefore recommended that a rather loose
and all encompassing definition be adopted for the term as
follows: "second sourcing" is a compendium of techniques and
methodologies utilized to ensure the development of alterna-
tive production sources. Any methodology which seeks to secure
the qualification of more than one major system production
source, then, can be defined as a second sourcing technique.
Although the only second sourcing methods examined in this
study are: Form-Fit-Function (F ) , Technical Data Package
(TDP) , Directed Technology Licensing (DL) , Leader Follower
(LF) , and Contractor Teaming (CT) , these methods are by no
means considered all inclusive.
Even though second sourcing is frequently alluded to in
the acquisition literature, it is a subject on which little
definitive research has been accomplished (neither do current
instructions on major weapon system acquisition contain specif-
ic reference to second sourcing or the methods through which
second sourcing is accomplished). Several current studies,
however, are being pursued on the general topic of production
competition. The Institute for Defense Analyses, the Logis-
tics Management Institute, and the Army Procurement Research
Office are all involved in such studies. The results of these
inquiries may add significantly to the body of knowledge avail-
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able to the Project Manager.
In the present atmosphere of a decreasing defense budget,
it becomes imperative that each and every person responsible
for the acquisition of weapon systems be on the lookout for
ways to improve the acquisition process. Historically, it has
been demonstrated that the existence of sole-source producers
of defense hardware is often a less than optimal situation —
there is often little motivation for such a contractor to be
truly effective and efficient, and, the cost benefits of com-
petition are lacking.
There are a number of possible reasons for pursuing second
sourcing on a given project. Cost savings from increased com-
petition; broadening the production base; evening out fluc-
tuations in the defense industry; achieving superior equip-
ment through increased production competition; meeting NATO
rationalization, standardization, and interoperability objec-
tives; attainment of socio-economic goals; and, political
considerations may all be facilitated by second sourcing.
Having decided on the objectives to be achieved through
second sourcing, it becomes necessary to determine the adapt-
ability of the project to second sourcing. Among the more
important considerations in making that determination are: it
must normally be established that there is a requirement for a
sufficiently large quantity of the system to be provided over
a number of years; problems associated with the transfer of
necessary technology must be surmountable; there must be suf-
ficient lead time to allow for the qualification of the second
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source; and, there must exist, in the marketplace, viable con-
tractors who are capable of performing as alternative manufac-
turers .
If it appears that the project is, indeed, adaptable to
second sourcing, reference to the Second Sourcing Methodology
Selection Model developed and expounded upon herein should
assist the decision maker in determining the most effective
means of establishing the second source. The model allows the
decision maker to compare the various second sourcing method-
ologies with respect to fourteen decision variables so that it
becomes possible to make a qualitative judgement regarding the
probable efficacy of the different methods given the parameters
of his project. The weightings assigned to the model factors
are not considered immutable. In fact, it is desirable that
the model be subjected to the test of experience in an attempt
to ascertain its true utility as a predictive tool.
The earlier in the life of the project that second sourc-
ing is considered, the more varied are the methodologies that
hold a potential for success. This does not mean that success-
ful second sourcing cannot be achieved when no provisions
therefor have been made prior to initial production. It does
mean to imply, however, that the options available become more
constrained, and the cost associated with development of a
second source is likely to be greater than if provision for




The measure of success or failure in a second sourcing
effort should be consistent with the objectives initially
espoused. There can be no single measure of success or failure
when it is recognized that there can be many reasons for sec-
ond sourcing the project in the first place. If cost savings
is the prime reason for second sourcing, then the effort may
be considered a failure (even if an alternative source is
eventually qualified) as long as the total cost of the acquisi-
tion, subsequent to second sourcing, is greater than would
have been experienced with a sole-source. Where mobilization
base maintenance or expansion is the major objective, the
development of a qualified second source, capable of producing
acceptable systems according to performance and delivery re-
quirements, could be deemed a success regardless of the cost
involved. Even in such a case, however, choice of that method-
ology which can accomplish the stated goal at the least cost
to the government must be considered an important considera-
tion. Reference to the model will, hopefully, help the Pro-
ject Manager to make this choice.
In closing, a note of caution is deemed appropriate. As
has been seen, second sourcing is an acquisition strategy that
can result in significant benefit to the government. On the
other hand, it is a strategy that must be selectively applied.
If attempted in a random or haphazard manner, the cost to the
government can be astronomical. There are severe economic,
legal, and technological barriers that must be overcome before
second sourcing can enjoy any measure of true success. Not
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every project will be able to overcome these obstacles, so
... "the bottom line" is that there must be an awareness of
not only the potential benefits of second sourcing but also
of the dangers inherent in the inappropriate application of
the technique.
It may also be appropriate, at this time, to recommend
potentially useful areas for further research in the general
area of second sourcing or production competition:
(1) Contractor Teaming is a relatively new concept that
deserves in depth analysis.
(2) The Model presented herein (SSMSM) can be tested on
current projects to determine its utility.
(3) Other second sourcing methods and decision variables
may be identified and examined in the hope of refining the
SSMSM.
(4) Quantification of the costs and benefits of second
sourcing can be attempted.
(5) Examination of second sourcing method hybrids may
result in identification of new methods that are more effec-
tive than any single method.
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SECOND SOURCING/DUAL SOURCING QUESTIONNAIRE
7,
What is "second sourcing/dual sourcing"?
What goals, objectives, or policy considerations are satis-




c. Types of projects facilitated?
d. Cost savings?
What problems have been encountered in second sourcing
your project?
a. How were problems overcome?
b. Any unsolved problems?
c. Affect of contract type/clauses?
d. How do you determine the quantity split between
original and second sources?
What measures of success/failure do you utilize in eval-
uating a second sourced acquisition?
a. Costs involved and their quantification
b. Benefits to be realized and their measurement
c. Reasons for success/failure
d. Specific factors enhancing or detracting from
second sourcing
e. Factors that might encourage the government or
the contractor to pull out of a second sourcing
situation
f. Concessions/modifications to contractor behavior
realized from the mere threat of second sourcing
g. Minimum production run requirements
How are viable competitors attracted to second sourcing?
a. Identification of contractors
b. Incentives
c. Contract type
What are the methods used to ensure the adequacy of the
technical data package?
What are the mechanics of second sourcing?
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If you were to advise another PM/PCO regarding the pre-
requisites for second sourcing, what would you tell him?
















a < z q
w * < 3
SIIIOZ»ihtl<h-OZ >-<-J-Q'«^ — OZ
> 2











Moreover any evidence of bids not independently reached shall be forwarded to
the IV ,i.i i tine nt ul Justice, as provided in I -I I I
3--216 Purchases in the Interest of National Defense or Industrial Mobiliza-
tion.
3-216.1 Authority. Pursuant to It) U.S.C. 2304(u)(16), purchases and con-
tracts may be negotiated if
—
"he [the Secretary! determines that (A) it is in the interest of national
defense to have a plant, mine, or other facility, or a producer, manufacturer, or
other supplier, available for furnishing property or services in case of a national
emergency; or (to) the interest of industrial mobilization in case of such an emer-
gency, or the interest of national defense in maintaining active engineering,
research, and development, would otherwise be subserved".
3-216.2 Application. The authority of this paragraph 3-216 may be used to
implement plans and programs developed under the direction of the Secretary to
provide an industrial mobilization base which can meet production requirements
for essential military supplies and services. The following are examples of situa-
tions when use of this authority should be considered:
(i) when procurement by negotiation is necessary to keep vital
facilities or suppliers in business; or to make them available in
the event of a national emergency;
(ii) when procurement by negotiation with selected suppliers is
necessary to train them in the furnishing of critical supplies or
services, to prevent the loss of their ability and employee skills,
or to maintain active engineering, research, and development
work; or
(iii) when procurement by negotiation is necessary to maintain
properly balanced sources of supply for meeting the require-
ments of procurement programs in the interest of industrial mo-
bilization; ( When the quantity required is substantially larger than
the quantity which must be awarded in order to meet the objec-
tives of this authority, that portion not required to meet such ob-
jectives will ordinarily be procured by formal advertising or by
negotiation under another negotiation exception.)
(iv) when procurement by negotiation is necessary to limit competi-
tion for current procurements of selected supplies or services
which are approved for production planning under the Industrial
Preparedness Program only to planned producers with whom in-
dustrial preparedness agreements for those items exist; or to
limit award to offerors who agree to enter into industrial
preparedness agreements,
(v) when procurement by negotiation is necessary to create or
maintain the required domestic capability for production of
critical supplies by limiting competition to items manufactured
in the United States or the United States and Canada; (It is not
necessary to use this negotiation authority when procuring items
covered by 1-2207.)
3-216.2
ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT REGULATION
APPENDIX C






(vi) when procurement by negotiation is necessary to continue in
production contractors who arc manufacturing critical items
when there would otherwise be a break in production;
(vii) when procurement by negotiation is necessary to divide current
production requirements among two or more contractors to pro-
vide for an adequate industrial mobilization base.
3-216.3 Limitaliim. The authority of this paragraph 3-216 shall not be used
unless and until the Secretary has determined, in accordance with the require-
ments of Part 3 of this Section III, that:
(i) it is in the interest of national defense to have a particular plant,
mine, or other facility or a particular producer, manufacturer, or
other supplier available for furnishing supplies or services in case of
a national emergency, and negotiation is necessary to that end;
(ii) the interest of industrial mobilization, in case of a national emergen-
cy would be subserved by negotiation with a particular supplier; or
(lii) the interest of national defense in maintaining active engineering,
research, and development, would be subserved by negotiation with
a particular supplier.
3-216.4 Records and Reports. Each Department is required to maintain a
record o( the name of each contractor with whom a contract has been entered
into pursuant to the authority of this paragraph 3-216, together with the amount
of the contract and (with due consideration given to the national security) a
description of the work required to be performed thereunder. These records, and
reports based thereon, are maintained through the Department of Defense
procurement reporting system described in 1-110 and Section XXI, Part 1.
3-217 Olherwis* Authorized by Law.
3-217.1 Authority. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2304(a)(I7), purchases and con-
tracts may be negotiated if
—
"otherwise authorized by law."
3-217.2 Application. The authority of this paragraph 3-217 shall be used only
if, and to the extent, approved for any Department and in accordance with De-
partmental procedures.
3-217.2
ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT REGULATION
APPENDIX C





MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MARTIN ...
-
SUBJECT: Establishing Second Source for Production of Defense
Equipment
Fy memorandum addressed to the Assistant Secretaries of
the Services and the Director, DLA, dated 13 January 1979,
Itr. Dale W. Church expressed his desire to identify one
or rore alternative acquisition strategies which would r.ore
often lead to establishment of a second source at an
early period in a production cycle. He solicited recom-
mended alternatives to be discussed at a meeting on 14
February 197% the purnose oc which was to arrive ac a
point where some uniform guidance may be drafted (Atch 1)
.
Py memorandum dated 29 January 1979, ycu designated
the undersigned to attend as the AF representative and ex-
pressed your intention to be kept fully informed as to the
proposed recommendations (Atch 2)
.
I have met with representatives of the Air Staff for
the purpose of discussing the nature of the problem and to
consider our inputs, including responses to a message sent
by the Air Staff to AFSC and AFLC (Atch 3) . The result ia
a Talking Paner (Atch 4) which I propose to give to Mr.




1. Dale Church Memo dtd IS Jan 79
2. Memo 2° Jan 79








OFFICE OF Tilt UMHER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE







SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (RD&A)
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MRA&L)
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RE&S)









second source in production is determined to be a justifiable
goal in the acquisition strategy, a reprocurement data package is
normally obtained from the initial source for use in open competition
a later date.
Based on a review of many previous programs, the data package which is
procured is seldom used. The main reason is that the lead time to
establish a second production source, after obtaining a sui table data
package, is so long that competition is no longer considered a viable
strategy. Thus the original sole source continues as the only pro-
duction source.
It is our firm belief that increased use of second sources for pro-
duction of defense-equipment will broaden our production base and even
out the fluctuation in the defense industry which lead to feast or
famine situations for individual firms.
Given the foregoing, we are attempting to identify one or more alter-
native acquisition strategies that would more often lead to the _
establishment of a second source at an early period in a production
cycle.
Your assistance, in the form of. recommended. .alternati ves , is..regu.ested_.._^
f7\^rme^:^rrn^hls
r
'subject will^be -held on 14 February 1979 in-my-orrjc^
('3El44)"at 1000 holTrs'. /The purpose "of;, this 'meeting, .w i.U.-t>e«to_ hear -you r_/








SAFALP/Ilr. Gordon/Is/January 25, 1979
29 JAN 1979
IlEIIGRAIsDUM FOR !ER. DALE U. CHURCH/ DEPUTY UTTDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (ACQUISITION POLICY)
SUDJTCT: Establishing Second Source for Production of
Defense Equipment
Reference your memorandum of IS January 1979/ this
subject.
Since the purpose of the proposed meeting ia to ex-
plore and identify acquisition strategies that would pore
often lead to establishment of a second source early in
production, I have concluded that my Deputy for Procurement
(TTarvey Cordon) T/ould best represent the Air Force. Al-
though he will attend in my place, I expect to be kept
fully informed as to his proposed recommendations and any
draft uniform guidance resulting from this collaborative
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SUBJECT". ESTABLISHING SECOND SOURCE FOR
Production
1. THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEER-
ING {ACQUISITION POLICY} HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT
OUR APPARENT
INABILITY TO OBTAIN COMPETITION DURING THE PRODUCTION
PHASE OF MAJOR
PROGRAM ACQUISITIONS. HE HAS NOTED THAT EVEN WHEN A
REPROCUREilENT
PACKAGE IS OBTAINED FROM THE DEVELOPER/INITIAL MANUFACTURER i
THE
•COST AND TINE REQUIRED TO HAVE ANOTHER SOURCE USE THE DATA
ARE
GENERALLY PROHIBITIVE. A POLICY FOR INCREASED USE
OF SECOND PRODUC-
TION SOURCES COULD, HOUEVER, BROADEN THE DEFENSE
PRODUCTION BASE
AND EVEN OUT THE FLUCTUATIONS SO OFTEN SEEN BY
DEFENSE RELATED
INDUSTRY.
2. BASED ON THE POTENTIAL POSITIVE BENEFIT OF SECOND
SOURCES, USDRSE
yOULD LIKE TO IDENTIFY SOME ALTERNATIVE ACQUISITION
STRATEGIES
WHICH NIGHT FOSTER THIS OBJECTIVE. YOUR VIEUS
AND SUGGESTIONS ARE





YOU SHOULD CONSIDER ARE THE LEADER-FOLLOUER CONCEPT-, AND THE USE Or
EdUIRED SECOND SOURCES AT SUBSYSTEM LEVEL. ANY SPECIFIC PROGRAM
EXPERIENCE IN DEVELOPING A SECOND SOURCE-. UHETHER SUCCESSFUL OR NOT-,
WHICH UE CAN RELATE TO USDR^E UOULD ALSO BE UORTHUHILE
.
3- YOUR THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE REQUESTED NLT IS FEB 71






ESTABLISHING SLCOHD SOURCE FOR PRODUCTION OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
There is no one recommended alternative to best establish
a second source for production of defense equipment. There
are a variety of acquisition methodologies which can be used,
but each approach has attendant consequences which nay be
either assets or liabilities. Therefore, it is our view that
the subject is best addressed in the following logical
sequence: policy goal(s); intrinsic nature of the defense
equipment to be acquired; and, available acquisition strategies/
methodologies.
There are many reasons for establishing a second source,
one or more of which may apply to any given acquisition.
Some of these reasons are compatible with one another and
some are not. Those we have identified are: (1) broaden-
ing the production base, (2) evening out the fluctuation in
defense industry which leads to feast or famine situations
for individual firms, (3) achieving savings through increased
competition, (4) achieving superior equipment through increas-
ed competition, (5) facilitating IIATO participation as co-
producers or through offsetting coproduction as subcontractors,
(6) facilitizing the attainment of socio-economic goals by
increased award to minority and small business contractors
and/or subcontractors, and (7) preserving competition for
the sake of competition per se.
To insure selection of the acquisition alternative
which would best accomplish establishment of a second source
early in a production cycle first requires prioritization
of the above goals. There is no one methodology which can
accommodate all these goals in any given acquisition. OSD
guidance must recognize this fact and should not be couched
in terms of recommended contracting alternatives. There
are contracting alternatives but their order of preference
is dependent upon which policy goal or combination of goals
is sought in the instant acquisition.
Having resolved the policy goal(s) to be met, it is
essential to then understand and evaluate the intrinsic
nature of the defense equipment to be produced. The follow-
ing list, perhaps not all inclusive, enumerates the kind of




(1) Intrinsic nature of the item to be produced in terns
Oi. i'cs LuijuiiiCft 1 ccr.pj.c."j.ty , t.io ctatc o_ the ?,rt/
the fabrication processes involved, and the tolerances
required;
(2) Existing industrial capacity;
(3) Ultimate quantity to be produced and the rate at
which the Government will place orders for production;
(4) Production leadtime;
(5) Investment in capital facilities and tooling required
for production;
(6) Production startup and other nonrecurring costs, in-
cluding first article acceptance testing;
X(7) Logistics concept to be employed;
(8) Political environment;
(9) Degree to which production will require access to
proprietary technical data and/or manufacturing
processes; and
0.0) Potential for commerciality and/or the existence of
essentially equivalent hardware in the commercial sector.
With answers to the aforementioned, together with
identification of the DOD goal (a), it is feasible to evaluate
which of the following contracting methodologies may
best accommodate establishment of a second source early in
the production cycle. These options, not listed in any
particular order of preference, are:
(1) Establishment of a Qualified Products List (QPL)
,
best suited for instances where there is a continuing
requirement, the costs for qualifying the product are
not unreasonable, and the quantity and rate at which
the equipment is acquired facilitates uninterrupted
production by competing producers.
(2) Leader/Follower Concept wherein the producer provides
technical assistance and data rights necessary for
other concerns to coproduce. The coproducer can be a
designated subcontractor, a subcontractor selected
by the prime producer, or a direct supplier to the Govern-
ment. This is best accomplished by competition for full
scale engineering development in the form of data rights




(1) Coproducfcion '..'heroin the f!cvcrn~fint, in proposal
evaluation and r.ource selection for full sea le engineer-
ing development, requires submission of. a detailed
coproduction plan to insure there is a subcontractor (a)
who will produce concurrently deliverable end item
equipnent/ priced in the production option.
(4) Use of 10 USC 2304(a) (16) to permit award of two
concurrent production contracts with a price premium
paid to insure award to a second source.
(5) Direct licensing (providing for the payment of a
royalty or a license fee) to facilitate one or more
additional sources to compete in follow-on production.
(6) Acquisition of a reprocurement data package either
for the entire system, selected subsystems, and/or
selected connonents.
(7) Two-phase acquisition in which the first phase is
limited to design and development with unrestricted
competition for production in accordance with the
Cover:ir.ent's detailed production specification.
(8) Breakout after initial production of subsystem (s)
or major components for direct acquisition by the
Government.
(9) Multi-year procurement of production after the initial
production buy to insure a production base sufficiently
substantial to facilitate meaningful competition by
concerns other than the initial producer.
There are several acquisition policies which, to
varying degrees, impede second source production. To the
extent we emphasize design-to-cost and life cycle costs,
these operate against competing the subsequent production
and/or second sourcing. It is not feasible to impose RIV7
commitments en a developer in the case of production
equipment manufactured by a second source. It may not be
feasible to implement design- to-cost incentives on a
developer for production equipment manufactured by another
source. Equally troublesome is the difficulty of incentivizing
life cycle cost goals when production equipment may be
manufactured by two or more producers. Where the logistics
concept and life cycle costs considerations are pre-eminent
and strongly favor manufacture of standardized equipment by
one source, the policy objective of establishing a second




While there are several possible alternatives, no
particular one is ideally suited l:o best accomplish the early
establishment of a second source in the absence of considera-
tion of and regard for competing DOD policy goals and
objectives. The selection of the preferred methodology i3
in large measure dependent upon an indepth understanding
of the nature of the equipment to be produced and the
nature and funding of the program- This means that the
problem nust be worked on a case by case basis*. Evaluation
must be made as early in the development/acquisition cycle
as possible to insure that the various options are not
inhibited by business, budgetary and/or policy decisions
made in the absence of a full understanding of their con-
sequences.
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